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Abstract: 
Globalization is accepted mostly as a process which brings the erosion of principles of national 
sovereign state. This is but one consequence of Globalization. It would be more precise to say, that Globalization 
is a process, which caused a global shift in the system of national self-identification, which existed since the 
Westphalian period. For Europe it meant the erosion of a nation-state system and the search for new forms of all 
European integration. For USA it really meant overcoming borders of nation state in terms of political 
responsibility and economic interests. But for Russia, Globalization put forward a challenge of… civic national 
self-identification, which Russia never had in its history before! This is the paradox of Globalization.  The 
analysis of this paradox and the threats coming out of such a contradictory situation is important not only for 
Russia, but also for all post-colonial and post-socialist countries, who lack the period of civic nation states in 
their history. 
The article answers two main questions: what are the specifics of challenge of civic national integration 
under the conditions of Globalization in general and how this problem is seen from Russia. 
Historically Russia transformed from a theocratic state directly into a secular empire, without passing 
through the stage of national civic transformation, when all forms of civic integration and social control of 
society over state should have been established. This caused a deep gap between the people and the bureaucratic 
elite, which namely privatized the state, using the society, as a means for economic and political boom on the 
international level. In such circumstances the success of the elite and it’s inclusion in world economic and 
cultural process was reached by the exclusion of the majority of population of the country from this process. 
This tendency was not new. It started at the end of the seventeenth century and now we can say that all the 
attempts to change the situation, including October Revolution 1917 couldn’t overcome this deep social 
contradiction of Russia. Globalization contributed much to sharpen this illness. It aggravated rapid integration of 
the Russian elite into the global elite and the exclusion of Russian society from the global economic, social and 
cultural process. So, as a result of Globalization, Russia is “pregnant” with the very tough conflict of interests 
and very serious crisis of legitimacy of all forms and institutions of political power. 
The urgency of the problem’s solution is illustrated by the figures, by social, economic, cultural and 
demographic decline of society on the background of extreme growth of wealth and criminalization of elite, 
rushing into the global competition of wealth, by predatory exploiting natural resources of the country. 
It is very important to understand, that in spite of all this, Russian society does not blame Globalization 
in all its problems. The perception of Globalization by Russians is quite ambivalent, they understand new 
perspectives and opportunities, that it can bring to the people, but they also understand, that the strategy and 
interest of existing political elite are not social, but private and do not coincide with the interests of society as 
much, as it should do. 
In such a situation the political elite is looking for new forms of legitimating its power, beginning with 
the substitution of democratic procedures by administrative measures (“power vertical”) and ending with the 
imitation of social contract by creating pseudo-civic institutions (“Social Chamber”) and new total ideology 
(“national idea”). The society is also looking for the solution of the contradiction.  
The question of who will win in this struggle will be crucial for the way, Russia enters the Global 
World. 
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A New Challenge for Civic National Integration: A Perspective from Russia. 
 
Alla Glinchikova 
 
From Russia, the process and origins of globalization appear ambiguous.   On one side, it is 
commonly accepted that Russia is a peripheral country and its role in globalization is as a 
supplier of raw materials to the developed countries and regions of the world. That is, the 
role of Russia in the process of globalization is very insignificant, and Russia is definitely not 
leading player in the globalization process. However, on the other side, we should not forget 
that the real and rapid development of the process of globalization as we see it now, has 
become possible because of … no, not Russia but the Soviet Union, where Russia had been 
the centre. More precisely, globalization was possible because of the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. In broad terms, the crisis and dissolution of the Soviet system in general, and, in 
particular, the crisis of a socialist pole as an alternative to the liberal capitalism, marked the 
end of bipolar system and the beginning of globalization, or the neoliberal type of capitalist 
development. Thus, the Soviet Union and Russia played a crucial role as a trigger for the 
beginning of the process of globalization, and were responsible for the dynamism which we 
now observe. 
   
The rapidly developing process of globalization has, in turn, become a new, grave challenge 
for Russia. This challenge makes it necessary for Russia to answer questions that it has either 
left unanswered or never had in its history. The most important of these questions is ‘What is 
Russia?’ Is it an Empire or is it a nation state? Is it a part of Europe or a part of Asia? Is it a 
self-sufficient power, which can create a geopolitical space and be its centre? Or is it a 
country that needs to join one of the existing geopolitical centres?  
  
For Russia, this “confusion” is not only a problem of geopolitical theory. Indeed, this is a 
core issue of public life, and a main reason for its crisis. Thirteen years after the dissolution 
of the USSR, two-thirds of the respondents in the Saratov region (the central part of Russia) 
still name the USSR as their motherland. And 51 percent of respondents have supported the 
idea of the reestablishment of the Soviet Union (See Velikaya, 2005). The reason for this is 
not imperial ambitions (although these ambitions may belong to the political elite). Rather, 
the reason for such attitudes is the deep crisis in Russian society. Russian society is still not 
 4
able to address the main challenge which globalization poses for Russia, namely, the 
challenge of defining a new national and political self-identity. In this paper, we will try to 
understand why this challenge is so difficult for Russia.  
 
Let us start with definition of globalization. There are a number of definitions, but they all, to 
some extent, boil down to “globalization is the process whereby state-centric agencies and 
terms of reference are dissolved in favour of a structure of relations between different actors 
operating in a context which is truly global rather than merely international” (Evans and 
Newhman, 1998: 20). Thus, the course of development in the international arena is pointing 
to the erosion of state sovereignty and the idea of the nation-state. However, this tendency is 
the opposite of the direction of Russian development which is towards the creation of a 
national civil society, a society which Russia has never had before.  
 
This is a unique characteristic of the Russian path in the modern epoch. In its past, Russia has 
been a theocratic state and then a secular empire, but it has never undergone the stage of a 
national civic secular state. As a result, society has not experienced a transformation from 
that of an object to that of a subject in the political process, and the state has not changed 
from being a goal to becoming an instrument of public interest protection. In the West, 
democratic political institutions and social practices were naturally established and developed 
during this transformation. These institutions and practices have been very important forms 
of political participation and civil control over state power in a framework of the civic 
secular state. 
 
Russia missed the natural development of a national civil state for a number of historical 
reasons and has been trying to either fill this “gap” in its socio-political history or, more 
usually, choosing its own specific path of development. This specific path has been an 
attempt to create a national state without a civil society and without a real transformation of 
the state to an instrument for the realization of public interest. This is an historical challenge, 
one which has been amplified by the reality of globalization in Russia.  
 
Following the dissolution of the Soviet system, globalization has affected forms of national 
self-identity and legitimacy of power, which had been long-settled since imperial times. 
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Furthermore, the unsolved problem of national civic transformation in Russia is again 
coming to the fore today. Today everybody understands that if this problem is not solved 
within a short period of time, the further collapse of Russia will be inevitable given the 
reality of processes of globalization. Alarming signals are obvious for Russia. 
 
Alarming signals for Russia. 
 
The first and very important negative sign of the effects of globalization on Russia is a 
significant increase of inequality. The Gini coefficient increased from 0.26 at the end of the 
Soviet era to 0.5 now. This situation in Russia is reflected by high concentrations of wealth 
and high levels of poverty. Russia has the highest number of billionaires in relation to its 
GDP – 36 billionaires for US$ 458 billion. In other words, 36 individuals in Russia own 
US$110 billion, equivalent to 24% of GDP (Forbes, 2004: 47). The majority of the 
billionaires are from Moscow – 33 out of 36. Even New York has only 31 (ibid: 48). The 
majority of the Russian population is far from being rich and 30 million people, or 
approximately one-fifth of the total population, live below the state determined poverty line 
(EIU, 2004). The income gap is unprecedented – the richest 10% of Russian population share 
50% of GDP, whereas the poorest 10% share only 6% (CIA, 2004).  
 
Globalization and the openness of Russia have not stimulated technical progress. On the 
contrary, globalization has further destroyed the economy, a process which has been on-
going since the late Brezhnev era. The structure of exports has changed since the dissolution 
of the USSR, with Russia increasingly becoming dependent on exports of natural resources. 
From 1992 there was a threefold increase of exports of raw materials. Oil and gas still 
dominate here and constitute three-quarters of total exports (Dzarasov, 2005: 119). 
According to the World Economic Forum, in 2004 Russia was ranked 70th out of 104 
countries for its competitiveness. In Soviet times, the state created 1,500-2000 new industrial 
enterprises every five years. During the “reforms”, the state withdrew from this role and the 
net number of new state enterprises was zero (ibid: 141). The deterioration of equipment is 
dangerously high. In the Soviet era, the average age of equipment was 8-10 years. Now it has 
increased to 20 years, which has resulted in an increase in man-caused catastrophes such as 
industrial accidents. 
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The rapid and spontaneous movement of the country towards integration with the global 
capitalist system has not increased labour productivity or product quality. Privatization of the 
majority of public enterprises, conducted under the leadership of global financial institutions, 
has resulted in an inefficient distribution of public treasures between a limited number of 
global “bubble scheme” participants. Today the fact is that 500 families in Russia are 
successors and owners of all public properties, which were created during the years of hard 
work of the entire population. This fact has led to the situation to where almost all surplus 
flows into the pockets of new owners for their personal needs (Menshikov, 2004: 261). Even 
the officially recorded personal expenditures of the richest Russian enterprise owners have 
constituted 12 per cent of GDP. To compare, dividends of the biggest US corporations 
constitute no more than 5 per cent of GDP (ibid 41). 
 
All of the above have led to a rapid shrinking of the Russian home market, even in 
comparison to Soviet times. For instance, the level of personal consumption in Soviet times 
was 45% of GDP. This does not include Soviet social welfare, which added an additional 
38%. Today, the share of personal consumption in GDP is approximately 49% of GDP but 
government purchases have fallen to 17% (ibid 256). This is leading to a dangerous conflict 
between home and foreign markets and an over-reliance on net exports which account for 
18% of GDP.1 The Russian “globalizing” elite is far from sharing the same interests as 
Russian society. In fact, the elite does not need this society anymore and society is becoming 
a burden for it. 
  
A few decades ago, Stalin suggested, “if there is no person, there is no problem”. This 
expression may be reasonably applied to the demographic situation in the modern neoliberal 
Russia. The death rate is higher than the birth rate, and the gap is dangerously widening. In 
1970, there were 14.6 births and 8.7 deaths per every 1000 people. In 2002, these numbers 
were 9.8 and 16.3 respectively (Russian Statistical Bureau, 2003).  
 
                                                 
1 The remaining 16% of GDP is the share of gross investment. 
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The list of Russian losses should be continued with the colossal capital flight from Russia, 
significant brain drain, destruction of world famous science schools, the degradation of the 
system of education and increasing illiteracy, the dissolution of social welfare and healthcare, 
and the erosion of Russian culture and spirituality.  
 
Immorality is becoming the main principle for success in modern Russia. As a result, 
corruption is worsening at all levels of power. In 2004, Russia was 90th out of 140 countries 
for its corruption level, and was ranked as one of most corrupt countries in Europe. Worse 
situations were observed only in Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Moldova, and Ukraine2.  
   
One of the results of the rise in corruption has been the fusion of power between commercial 
and criminal structures. This corrupt elite has led to political feuding, which is, in turn, 
causing ethnic and religious conflicts. As a result, Russian society in general is not stable. In 
the unstable reality, the elite is becoming less controlled by society, and authoritarian 
tendencies are becoming stronger.  
 
One of the leading Russian economists and a formerly active proponent of market reforms, S. 
Menshikov, suggests in his latest book, which analyzes Russian capitalism in the era of 
globalization, that (2004: 422) the “Russian experience has not proved that capitalist methods 
of economic organization do not have any visible advantages over the state command 
economy of the Soviet time”, and that (ibid 48) “the majority in the Forbes list have been the 
successors of the USSR’s  natural resources and enterprises”. The Russian “peculiarity” of 
global capitalism is very simple – on one side, Russia is a source of the accumulation of 
capital, but on the other side, foreign countries, not Russia, are the main places of its deposit 
and spending (ibid 72).  
   
Does this all mean that Russian society is rejecting, and opposing, globalization? To answer 
this question, let us look at the attitudes of Russian society towards globalization. 
 
Attitudes of Russian society toward globalization 
                                                 
2 See www.transparency.org 
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According to a 2005 survey, about half the respondents (46%) see globalization as a means 
for the further redistribution of the world resources in favour of strong and rich countries. 
36% of respondents consider globalization as a positive process of spreading science and 
technology all over the world. 24% of respondents think that globalization is a process of 
increasing the power of TNCs. And only 22% of respondents say that globalization is a 
process of creating a global society (Levashov, 2005: 17). These results suggest that for 
Russia, globalization is not a form of erosion of power of nation-states, but it is a form of the 
power of the strong over the weak.  
 
In the same survey, 59% of respondents have named increasing poverty in Russia as the main 
problem of globalization. The second negative outcome of globalization, pointed out by 45% 
of respondents, is increasing infringement of human rights (ibid 18). This finding is 
interesting because human rights were one of the  main slogans used to support globalization 
in Russia. Finally, 44% of respondents believe that globalization has created problems of 
environmental degradation in Russia (ibid 18).  
 
In answering the question of how to find ways to solve the problems caused by globalization, 
Russians do not appeal to international institutions. Only 13% of respondents believe that 
creating effective international regulatory organizations might help (ibid 18). This is an 
expected result. For Russian society, the negative outcomes of globalization are, first of all, 
the result of the inefficiency of the Russian state itself. The state, not globalization per se, is 
the source of all problems for ordinary Russians. Despite the wealth of untapped resources, 
Russia’s inefficient government is not able to protect its citizens from poverty and 
overexploitation. The state is also unable to protect human rights and the dignity of the nation 
in the international arena. Instead, it allows the looting of country’s resources without 
concern for Russia’s future, as well as ignoring the well-being of its society. 
 
In its perception of globalization per se, Russian society is ambivalent. Russians do not only 
see the problems but they also realize the new perspectives and opportunities globalization 
brings. In surveys, 43% of respondents answered positively the question of whether they and 
their families have benefited from globalization, whereas 44% of respondents had a negative 
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answer (ibid 19). Only 28% of respondents agreed that overall, globalization had brought 
positive perspectives for human development (ibid 19). However, this is with regards to the 
current situation. Only 18% of respondents have extended their pessimism to the future (ibid 
20). These results show that overall, Russian society understands the necessity of the further 
integration of Russia into the global world, and considers this process as positive and as 
opening new opportunities. However, society is not satisfied with forms and methods this 
integration has taken to date.  
 
Which forms of global integration are preferred by Russians? The most common answer is 
that Russia should become a centre for different nations, as the Soviet Union was. However, 
the number of respondents with this opinion decreased from 44% in 1992 to 32% in 2004. 
Only 13% in 1992 responded that Russia should remain in its national borders. In 2004, the 
number of respondents with this opinion increased significantly to 28%. Concurrently, the 
pessimistic prognosis of respondents regarding the further deterioration of conditions in 
Russia with globalization has fallen from 18% in 1992 to 12% in 2002 (ibid 20). This 
indicates that the national self-identity of Russians is changing over time. More and more 
people accept the idea of integrating with the global system from the existing Russian base. 
However, respondents do not have a clear view on long-term perspectives. As a result, the 
majority of Russians have not demonstrated confidence about a stable future. Society has its 
doubts regarding the state’s potential. Respondents have listed the following obstacles for 
adequate entering global processes by Russia: social problems; level and quality of life; 
national economy; and the system of education. Ensuring human rights has reached fifth 
place in this list (ibid 22). 
 
Let us now see how the state is reacting to the problems identified by Russian society. 
 
Globalization and the Russian State. 
 
The perception of society by the state is very specific in Russia. On one side, during the 
entire history of Russia, society has supported the rise of the state power. On the other side, 
Russian society always suffered from it’s own state, as the state has always taken the role of 
guarding and supervising society. The state pretended to  control all spheres of life, and tried 
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to paralyze any attempts by society to become strong, to form alternative political movements 
and to develop various forms of  national civic integration.  
 
At the same time, the Russian state has never accepted such practices as against society or 
“antisocial”. Instead, it has claimed that this is “a peculiarity of Russian political culture”, 
according to which Russian society has been politically naïve and inexperienced, and, 
consequently, cannot fully realize its own interests and goals. The society needs the state, 
which is able to act in support of the main interests of this society. In return for state 
leadership, society agrees to be unified. Facing challenges of… globalization this time 
(before it had been fascism, Tatars, Polish, French, internal enemies, and so forth), Russia 
needs this unity. However, the state is not able to formulate the specific challenges of  
globalization and, consequently, cannot explain the necessity of national unity to face 
globalization. The solution to national unity is being sought in the imported slogan of the 
need to fight “international terrorism”. This slogan is also convenient for the Russian elite, 
which can now easily integrate into different global segments.  
 
The main feature of the state’s political concept of “national unity” is a thesis about the non-
necessity and inadmissibility of real political opposition. A vast number of ideologists are 
trying to prove that Russia is a country which is originally disposed toward authoritarianism 
and that democracy is not only non-understandable in Russia but also bad for the country. To 
illustrate this inclination of Russians to slavery, ideologists either recall Stalin’s prison camps 
or, depending on the context, appeal to the Russian Orthodox soul, which is tolerant to 
coercion; moreover, the Orthodox soul is often enjoying it. This ideology also highlights a 
special Russian patriotism, sacrificial in its nature and different from other nations’ 
patriotism. Russians do not only have to tolerate and accept the power of the state, they also 
have to like it. This is the historical and ideological foundation of what modern Russian 
propaganda is appealing to.  
 
The irrational attitude towards power is an important resource used in Russian elite’s PR. 
This explains the fact that during the Presidential election campaign, the main candidate – 
current President of Russia (Putin) – had purposefully not participated with other candidates 
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in any political discussions, and had not introduced his Programme. He staked his campaign 
on his charisma and on the blind trust of people. 
 
This cynical approach is convenient for those who want to use the political moment and 
disappear, but it is not enough to remain in long-term power. If the real interests of the power 
do not coincide with the interests of  society, charisma and trust will not help. Unfortunately, 
the divergence of interests is obvious today.  
 
How has globalization influenced the divergence of interests of those in power and the 
rest of society in Russia? 
 
At the end of the 17th century, in order to become an exporter of wheat for European markets, 
the Russian bureaucratic elite applied different forms of non-economic coercion to society 
with the reintroduction and expansion of serfdom, a trend which stood in contrast to that in 
western Europe where the peasantry were being ‘freed’ from the land (Kagarlitsky, 2004). 
This was the first time that Russia had tried a unique scheme of globalization – a scheme in 
which the elite thrived from its inclusion in the world economic processes at the same time as 
the majority of population was excluded from such processes.  
 
This divergence was overcome by the catastrophe of 1917 when society  tried to overcome 
the contradiction between the elite and the rest of the population. However, the result was 
that Russia became isolated from the rest of the world, and market mechanisms within the 
country were distorted.  
 
The Russian model of development was appropriately known as “communist” or “socialist” 
because two communist principles were the base of the model: first, a communist principle of 
investing into the future unconnected to profitability; and second, a communist principle of 
distribution aimed at eradicating inequality and creating social harmony. The Soviet system, 
however, had one very important disadvantage. The state, not civil organizations, had 
concentrated all of the functions of management and control in its hands, proclaiming any 
criticism as “antinational” and “antisocial”. This provided the elite with a superior 
uncontrolled position, completely isolated from society, and from which it degenerated. 
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By the middle of the 1980s, the privileges of the elite were threatened as a result of the aging 
and death of the heads of the elite families, the majority of whom came to power during the 
Stalinist 1930s. The deaths of clan leaders would have meant an end of perks and privileges 
for all family members because new, relatively young party leaders could have debarred 
them from elitist or privileged entitlements. The only way for the post-communist elite to 
keep power was to convert power into property.  
 
After 1945, the sphere of foreign economic activity had been the main place of work for the 
children and grandchildren of the ruling elite. After the state’s monopoly on foreign trade 
was abrogated in 1987, the post-communist elite had received an opportunity to grow rich 
exploiting the price differences of raw materials on the internal (socialist) and external 
markets. The global centres of power and elites have also benefited from this changed path in 
Russia, and consequently, supported new Russian “businessmen”. The further development 
of Russia has followed the scenario of the Russian elite entering the global market 
accompanied by the concurrent exclusion of Russian society from this market and by 
destroying the internal Russian market.  
 
This is not to say that only the Russian elite was interested in the transformation of the Soviet 
model. Russian society, tired from isolation and total control of the state within the country, 
also supported these processes. Having used citizens’ support of globalization, the Russian 
elite has integrated into the global system. But as soon as its power became established, the 
elite has attempted to isolate the majority of population from the global processes and to take 
absolute control over society. The only difference with Soviet times is that the Russian elite 
now has the West to support it. The modern Russian elite has learnt very well how to satisfy 
the interests of global financial structures and, without a doubt, will keep receiving carte 
blanche to conduct antisocial policies within Russia.  
 
What are these antisocial policies? They lie in: the privatization of natural resources and 
other strategically important sectors of economy; the destruction of the system of social 
welfare, education and health care; capital flight from Russia; unclear and complicated laws 
and regulations, which give an opportunity for corruption; ungrounded international 
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borrowing, which will have to be paid off by future generations; and the lobbying interests of 
international corporations, which are destroying our environment and depraving our youth. 
But the above list does not reflect the most negative outcomes.  
 
The main danger is that the Russian elite is becoming strongly attached to the global 
financial and political centres of power. The further these processes are developed, the less 
legitimate Russian power becomes. In 1999, the coercive oligarchy of Vladimir Putin 
succeeded the commercial oligarchy of Yeltsin’s era. Has it changed anything for the 
country? 
 
Yes, it has changed a few things. Society’s perception of Putin’s regime is contradictory. On 
one side, this oligarchy is more patriotic and seems to be more protective of state 
sovereignty. The coercive oligarchy does not stand in the relationship to state power as it did 
in the commercial oligarchy. The commercial oligarchy and state power were linked but 
separate; the present coercive oligarchy is the state itself, that is, the staff of the 
Administration of the President has concurrently been holding leading positions in the main 
resource-based industries. The position of commercial oligarchs today is limited by the rules 
of the coercive oligarchy – business oligarchs can continue their activities only if they accept 
these rules.  
 
On the other side, the interests of the coercive oligarchy still do not coincide with the 
interests of society. The antisocial character of the Russian elite has not changed. But using 
the slogan of the defence of the state interests, the new elite has manufactured a way of 
preventing public protests. Even shrinking democracy is presented as a benefit of 
strengthening control over society. The new political elite has replaced democratic 
procedures by administrative measures - the principle of “power vertical” – with the 
Presidential appointment of regional governors. Furthermore, the coercive oligarchy is 
limiting any movements for creating new political parties by attempting to put all levels of 
legislatures under the control of executive power, which makes new parties dependent not on 
society but on state power. The coercive oligarchy is also increasing its control over the mass 
media.  
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At the same time, the state is preserving some of the rules of the game by abiding by 
international norms for democratic behaviour. Firstly, civic institutions are allowed to 
participate in consultations in the Civic Chamber established and subsidized by the President 
Administration. Secondly, the official constitution recognizes and upholds democratic rights 
and freedoms. Thirdly, the President himself is head of a few social programmes. Fourthly, 
the machinery of the law is able to conduct investigations into corruption. Finally, the 
coercive oligarchy, unlike the commercial oligarchy, is better able to negotiate on various 
issues with regional leaders. Despite these positive aspects, the fact is that without a 
coincidence of interests with those of society, power is not stable. Furthermore, this 
instability may become dangerous in the longer term.  
 
Lessons for Russia from Globalization 
 
The main difference between the current globalization and imperialism is that in the latter, 
social contradictions mostly lie between nation-states, whereas in the former, they tend to be 
between the global elite and the global civic society, even though neither the global elite nor 
global civic society are monolithic in terms of their structure, interests, and their degree of 
influence in the world.  
 
Confrontation between the global elite and global society is not even, but the tendency is that 
the global elite is winning over society. Society’s “losses” are different in different world 
regions. In some places, it takes the form of corruption, loss of social welfare, or a crisis of 
democratic institutions. In other places, it is accompanied by the rapid degradation of social 
cohesion and social values and by economic, social, cultural, and demographic catastrophes. 
Overall, it should be argued that degrading processes are present, to a different extent, in 
different regions of the world. The extent to which social degradation takes place depends on 
the degree of civil society development at the time of globalization.  
 
For those countries where civil society is already developed, globalization is a threat to 
mechanisms of societal influence over the political processes. Conversely, countries where 
societies had not transformed from objects to subjects of political activities, have suffered the 
most from globalization. These societies are deficient in the degree of internal civic 
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integration and political participation. In short, for countries without a developed civil 
society, globalization means the destruction of the society itself.  
 
Russia belongs to the second group of countries. Its peculiarity is that globalization has not 
only contributed to the slowing of economic and social development but has also led to a 
national catastrophe. One cannot compare an increasing level of illiteracy in countries where 
the literacy rate was originally low, with a country like Russia, which not only had a 100% 
literacy rate but only two decades ago was also a leader in the world of university degrees per 
capita. In the same relative terms, this argument is also relevant to inequality, unemployment, 
and other social indicators. Russia and other post-Soviet countries are unique – they had 
reached a level of industrial development comparable to the West, but it has been nearly 
totally destroyed by globalization. Why? 
 
Russia in the twentieth century can be characterized as moving from a semi-theocratic state 
to an industrial state, but one which had not developed in either period a civil society. Soviet 
totalitarianism was the last opportunity for Russia to compete with developed civil societies. 
The strict hierarchy of  societies in the modernist era had forced national elites to correlate 
their egotistical interests with the interests of the societies that they controlled.  
 
Eroding nation-state sovereignty, globalization has offered unprecedented scope for the 
global integration of elites from different states. Entering the community of the global elite, 
national elites are presented with the opportunity of political and economic survival without 
the need for support from their national societies. Although the problem of legitimating their 
power still exists for them, it is becoming a question of political PR only. In such a situation, 
elites are not concerned about the real basis for countries’ prosperity. Instead, they are trying 
to create different ways of successfully imitating “social consent”. A number of mythological 
slogans, such as “international terrorism” or “national idea”, are becoming a basis for 
developing these schemes.  
 
One should not forget that the elite is not trying to solve social problems; it is rather using 
real problems as a means of legitimating the power of the global elite. Bureaucratic 
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manipulations of public opinion can never lead to a real national idea which may be 
transferred into the process of civic integration.  
 
Thus, separating the prosperity of national elites from the prosperity of national societies, 
globalization has erased the last connection between public interests and the interests of the 
corporate elite. But this connection was a base for social progress in regions without 
developed civil societies and public participation mechanisms. When national elites are 
becoming more and more dependent on the global elite, rather than on national societies, it 
puts the survival of societies at a high degree of risk.  
 
The question is why has Russian society, which had been able to create a mighty state and to 
protect the country from a number of invaders during a thousand years, not been able to 
protect itself from the destroying power of the Russian elite in the era of globalization?  
 
A Russian peculiarity is that Russia is “the world of worlds”.3 That is, Russia synthesizes 
patterns of development from different regions of the world.  This explains the fact that in the 
process of civil society development, the country faces obstacles inherent in the post-colonial 
world, even though Russia had never been a real colony.  
 
As an industrial country, Russia has faced the same challenges of national civic integration as 
developed Western countries have. These challenges are: the crisis of formal political 
institutions; the crisis of traditional forms of social integration related to the rise of the 
middle class in the late 20th century; and the crisis of traditional forms of democratic political 
participation.   
 
As a post-socialist country, Russia has faced the problem of unprotected civic sovereignty in 
a socialist state, both theoretically and practically. Marxism-Leninism did not tolerate social 
self-identity, horizontal integration of society, social and political activities within society, 
and, as a result, had not allowed public control over the elite. According to Marxist-Leninist 
ideology, a main goal for society was to expropriate power and pass it to the “party of the 
                                                 
3 An expression of a famous Russian historian and publicist of the middle of the 20th century, Mikhail Gefter.  
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working class”. Concurrently with the power, the state had gathered all political and social 
functions including the function of public control. The society had dissolved in the reality of 
the totalitarian state.  
 
However, the main obstacle for developing civil society in Russia is that the country is not 
only post-socialist but post-colonial as well. From the end of the 17th century, Russia had 
been a colony and a metropolis at the same time.  The Russian elite had played the role of a 
metropolis whereas the majority of population had been in colonial dependence on the elite. 
This was a peculiarity of the Russian empire. The majority of the population had not been a 
part of metropolis, and, as a result, Russian society has inherited traditional post-colonial 
patterns.  
 
The main feature of post-colonial society is the incompleteness of the processes of civic 
national integration due to the incompleteness of the forming of the national civic state in the 
period of colonialism. The missed stage of the national civic state is a serious obstacle for 
forming civil societies in postcolonial regions. The situation is even more difficult for Russia 
as it has faced all three types of problems (industrial, post-socialist and post-colonial). 
 
These are problems common for Russia and to other world regions. But there is also a 
specific Russian obstacle to forming civic activity in the country. This obstacle is rooted in 
the political culture based on Russian Orthodox religious traditions. A specific type of 
Orthodox personality is hardly compatible with civil and political institutions of the Western 
type, which are based on absolutely different types of individuality. 
 
Conclusion.  
 
The first and main conclusion is that, in order to be able to face the challenges of 
globalization, there is no alternative to the development of civil society and civic forms of 
social activity. If nations want to survive they must form civil societies. Here one should 
agree with those who insist that Russia may certainly learn from Western experience. But the 
second conclusion is that Russia will never be able to repeat Western experience exactly. 
There are two reasons for this.  
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Firstly, our forms of civic activities are different from Western ones because they have to 
coincide with Russian political culture and the Russian type of personality. Secondly, Russia 
has to form a civil society in the period of globalization, that is, faced with the reality of the 
erosion of the sovereignty of nation-states. Furthermore, globalization is neoliberal in its 
character; therefore, it is in contradiction to the processes of civic national integration. An 
important instrument for dividing global civil society is fostering intra- and international 
conflicts under patriotic and religious slogans. This is very common for regions without 
developed civil societies. A tactic of the global neoliberal elite is a substitution of civic 
national self-identity with national-chauvinism, fascism, and religious fundamentalism.  
 
The question is what to do when faced with such a reality? Should international civil society 
“wait” until “backward” post-socialist and post-colonial regions overcome the problem of 
civic national self-identity? Does this mean that global civil society will only form when new 
“segments” join it after their civic maturing?  
 
Not at all! This is a mistake and a dangerous strategy. Global elites are rapidly integrating, 
which makes globalization of civic processes difficult. Integration of global elites, by 
destroying social and economic infrastructure, is leaving little chance for civic development 
in post-colonial and post-socialist regions. Global civil society should not wait until these 
regions mature. They will never mature, and time is working against them. Instead, global 
civil society should influence civic processes in post-socialist and post-colonial countries by 
stimulating and supporting their civic development.  
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